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STUDENT NOTES
PROPERTY iN THE GOODS UNDER WEST VmmiA LAw

A "sale" has been defined as the transfer of the absolute or general property in a thing for a price in money. 1 Although the writers on
the subject are not in accord as to the precise definition of the term,
it is generally agreed that an essential ingredient of every sale is
the transfer of property in the goods from the seller to the buyer.2
In this connection "goods" refers to the thing itself, which is the
subject of the sale, and "property" is used in the sense of the interest
which the owner has in the goods.3 "General property", as used in
the above definition, means the entire interest as contrasted with
a "special property", which is a lesser interest, the transfer of which
4
does not constitute a sale.
Whether the property has in fact passed to the buyer and the
precise time of such passage often determines the rights of the
parties with respect to risk of loss, remedies for breach of the agree1

Cohen v. King Knob Club, 55 W. Va. 108, 112, 46 S.E. 799, 801 (1904);

cf. UsNxom SArLs ACT § 1 (2).
2 BENjmAN, SALE 1 (6th ed. 1920); 1

MECHEM,

SATEs 3 (1901); BROWN,

SALES 1 (1894).
3 VOLD. SALEs 5 (1931).
4 1 MECHEM, SALES 4 (1901).
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ment, application of criminal laws, collection of insurance on the
goods, and also the rights of creditors of either the buyer or seller.5
The purpose of this note is to examine the West Virginia decisions
treating of property 6 in the goods, primarily with regard to the
rights of the parties to the transaction.
The West Virginia decisions follow the general rule of the common law as codified in the Uniform Sales Act 7 that property in
specific or ascertained goods is transferred at such time as the
parties intend. The intent of the parties is gathered from the terms
of the contract, the nature of the property, its condition and situation, and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby. 8 'Where
the goods are sufficiently designated so that no question can arise
as to the thing intended, it is not absolutely necessary that there
should be a delivery, or that the goods should be in a deliverable
condition, or that the quantity or quality, when the price depends
on either or both, should be determined; these are circumstances
indicating intent, but are not conclusive."9 "But where anything
is to be done by the vendor or by the mutual concurrence of both
parties for the purpose of ascertaining the price of the goods, as
by weighing, testing, or measuring them, where the price is to
depend upon the quantity or quality of the goods, the performance
of these things, in the absence of anything indicating a contrary
intent is to be deemed presumptively a condition precedent to the
transfer of property, although the individual goods are ascertained
and are in such a state that they may and ought to be accepted."1 0
The general rule is that delivery of possession is not indispensable
to pass title to personal property under a contract of sale when the
parties evince an intention to pass title before delivery." But where
the chattel sold is not in a deliverable state and the order therefor
has been executed by the manufacturer for construction of the
5 This list is not intended to be exhaustive. See BnAucmm, SUTmnLAND
& WIrcox, CouonmcIAL TRANSACTIONS 22 (1958).
6 The West Virginia decisions use the terms "property" and "title" interchangeably and they will be so used in this note.

7 § 18; West Virginia has not adopted the Act, but has, on occasion, fol-

lowed it as persuasive authority. See Kemble v. Wiltison, 92 W. Va. 82, 89,

114 S.E. 869, 372 (1922).
8 Furrow v. Bair, 84 W. Va. 654, 100 S.E. 506 (1919).

9 Lynch v. Merrill, 72 W. Va. 514, 516, 78 S.E. 669 (1918); Morgan v.

King, 28 W. Va. 1, 14 (1886).

10 Morgan v. King, 28 W. Va. 1, 14 (1886).

11 R. H. Thomas Co. v. Lewis Hubbard & Co., 79 W. Va. 188, 90 S.E.
816 (1916); cf. UNwronm SALs ACT § 19, rule 2. Note qualification: "unless
a different intention appears."
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article, the buyer acquires no title thereto until it is delivered in
12
its finished state.
The Uniform Sales Act, § 17 provides that "where there is a
contract to sell unascertained goods, no property in the goods is
transferred until the goods are ascertained ....
."Williston states
that there can be no question as to this rule as the transfer of ownership cannot be predicated on goods unless they are in existence and
can be identified by the terms of the bargain. 13 The West Virginia
14
cases are in accord.
Where the contract is for the sale of goods generally, identified
merely by description, any goods answering to the description would
ordinarily be sufficient to satisfy the contract. However, before
the property in such goods can pass to the buyer, there must be
some unequivocable act or acts completely and finally designating
the goods as the very goods upon which the contract is to act. 15
This is known as appropriation of the goods to the contract. 16
The West Virginia courts do not speak of appropriation of goods
to the contract, but arrive at the same result by an expansive construction of the term "delivery". It is a rule of the common law
that property in personal chattels passes only by actual delivery
of the thing, except, when by usage or custom, or by agreement of
17
the parties, a virtual delivery is substituted for actual delivery.
The exception to the rule seems to be the basis for the appropriation
doctrine.
In Buskirk Bros. v. Peck the court said that "if goods be counted
out and set apart for the purchaser, there is such a constructive
delivery that the title will vest in the purchaser....'18 However, it
12
Revelle v. McQuay, 86 W. Va. 129, 101 S.E. 76 (1919); Poling v.
Huffman, 84 W. Va. 199, 99 S.E. 445 (1919); Moore v. Patchin, 71 W. Va.

192, 76 S.E. 426 (1912).
13 2

WILLSTON, SALES §
14Buskirk Bros. v. Peck,

258 (rev. ed. 1948).
57 W. Va. 360, 50 S.E. 432 (1905); Hood v.

Bloch, 29 W. Va. 244 (1886); Morgan v. King, 28 W. Va. 1 (1886).
15 1 MEcHam, SALES 398 (1901).
16 See UNiosmu SALEs Act § 19, rule 4 (1) "Where there is a contract
to sell unascertained goods by description and goods of that description
and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract,
either by the seller with the assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the assent
of the seller, the property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer."
Cf. UNWORM CoaMwMx. CODE § 2-401, now enacted into law in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 12A (1954), and Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAws
c. 106, Mass. Acts 1957, c. 765.
17Pleasants v. Pendleton, 6 Rand. (27 Va.) 473 (1828).
1856 W. Va. 360, 369, 50 S.E. 432 (1905).
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has been held that before there can be a constructive delivery, the
goods must be in such condition that they are susceptible of actual
delivery.19
An early Virginia case2 0 laid down the rule that where the goods
are part of an ascertained mass of the same kind and quality and
no selection is required, but only separation from the general mass,
title to a part of the mass may pass, if the parties so intend, without
awaiting actual separation. The rule has been approved in some
states and sharply criticized in others. 2 ' The West Virginia court
discussed the rule in State v. Hughes22 and stated: "Whatever may
be the law with reference to a necessity for a severance where the
goods are of a uniform value and quality, it is well settled that such
a severance is necessary to vest property in the vendee where the
goods are not of a uniform quality and value."
It is equally clear that no sale can be complete so as to pass
title to the goods where the mass itself out of which the goods are
23
agreed to be sold is not ascertained.
In regard to sales of growing timber, owing to the peculiar nature
of the subject matter, contracts showing an intention to separate it
immediately from the soil are deemed to pass title upon severance
from the soil and not before.2 4 Otherwise, the contract would be
one for the sale of an interest in real estate.
The essence of the appropriation doctrine is expressed by the
25
Virginia court in American Hide & Leather Co. v. Chalkey & Co.,
as follows: "Title to non-specific goods does not pass until an appropriation of the specific goods has been made with the assent of
both buyer and seller." Buskirk Bros. v. Peck,2 6 though not using
the term "appropriation", states a comparable West Virginia view.
It has long been regarded as settled law that when a vendor
delivers goods to a carrier by order of the purchaser, such delivery
is a delivery to the vendee and vests the property in him imme19
2 Back & Greiwe v. Smith, 66 W. Va. 47, 66 S.E. 1 (1909).
0 Pleasants v. Pendleton, 6 Rand. (27 Va.) 473 (1828).
21 For citation of cases, see 17 M.J., Sales § 49 (1951).
22 22 W. Va. 743, 751 (1883).
23 Id. at 752.
24Buskirk Bros. v. Peck, 57 W. Va. 360, 50 S.E. 432 (1905); Null v.
Elliott, 52 W. Va. 229, 43 S.E. 173 (1902).

25 101 Va. 458, 44 S.E. 705 (1903), syl. 1.
2657 W. Va. 360, 50 S.E. 432 (1905).
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diately on its delivery to the carrier.27 However, the goods, when
delivered to the carrier, must be of the kind, quantity and quality
28
called for by the contract to pass property therein to the buyer.
Where the contract requires goods to be packed and shipped in a
certain manner and goods conforming to the contract are so packed
and shipped, title to the goods passes to the buyer.2 9 But where the
seller ships the goods consigned to himself, property does not pass
to the buyer.8 0 If the goods ordered and the goods sent are the
same, an acceptance by the buyer is not essential to complete the
bargain and the rights of the seller are just as complete as if there
had been a full and final acceptance. 31
If the seller has done all that the contract requires of him, title
passes whether payment has been made or not, unless the contract
32
provides otherwise in express terms or by necessary implication.
The contract may provide for inspection of the goods by the buyer
and when so provided, such inspection is a condition precedent to
3
the passage of title.
Title to goods shipped to the buyer before the time agreed upon
does not pass to the buyer unless he accepts the goods or otherwise
waives his objection to a premature delivery. 34 Similarly, where
fruit trees ordered for planting in the fall were delivered after the
time for transplanting has passed, they remained the property of
the seller upon the buyer's refusal to accept them.85 Even where
goods are shipped to a person who did not order them, he is liable
for the purchase price if he fails to return the goods or notify the
seller within a reasonable time that he refuses to accept them.8 6
Historically, the risk of loss has followed the title as an incident
of ownership. 7 An early West Virginia case 8 states the general
common law rule as follows: "Where there is a contract for an
27 Mullins v. Farris, 100 W. Va. 54, 181 S.E. 6 (1925); State v. Hughes,

22 W.
28 Va. 743 (1883). See URmoiF~r SALEs ACT § 19, rule 4 (2).
Mullins v. Farris, 100 W. Va. 54, 131 S.E. 6 (1925).
29
Vaccaro Bros. v. Farris, 92 W. Va. 655, 115 S.E. 830 (1928).
30
Bak & Greiwe v. Smith, 66 W. Va. 47, 66 S.E. 1 (1909).
31
Dixie Appliance Co. v. Bourne, 138 W. Va. 810, 77 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
3
2 Sharp v. Campbell, 89 W. Va. 526, 109 S.E. 611 (1921).
33
Elias & Brother v. Boone Timber Co., 85 W. Va. 508, 102 S.E. 488

(1920).
34
35
36

Emerson Shoe Co. v. Neely, 94 W. Va. 657, 129 S.E. 718 (1925),

Weltner v. Riggs, 8 W. Va. 445 (1869).
Thompson v. Douglas, 35 W. Va. 837, 13 S.E. 1015 (1891).
372 WILLmSTON, SALs 801 (rev. ed. 1948). See UNxFo m SALEs AcT
CoDE § 2-509.
§ 22 (a). Cf. UNoRm Co-N.v=.iAc
38Hobbs-Taylor & Co. v. Steamboat Interchange, 1 W. Va. 57, 66 (1865).
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immediate sale of a chattel, and nothing remains to be done by the
vendor, as between him and the vendee, the vendor immediately
acquires a property in the price and the vendee a property in the
goods, and then all the consequences resulting from the vesting
of the property follow, one of which is that if it be destroyed, the
loss falls on the vendee."
Under an f.o.b. origin contract, whereby the seller's obligation under the contract ends when the goods are placed on board
cars at the seller's city for shipment to the buyer, the title and risk
of loss or delay are on the buyer, assuming that delivery was made
to the carrier at the agreed time.39 When goods are to be delivered
in cars at the depot in a certain city, the goods remain the goods
of the vendor and at his risk until they arrive at the depot. But
upon arrival in such city, without being unloaded, and without any
notice of their arrival, they become the property of the vendee and
4
are thenceforth at his risk. 0

The common law rule that loss follows title is subject to the
exception that where the seller retains legal title as security for the
performance of the contract, risk of loss is on the buyer.41 The
Uniform Conditional Sales Act 42 provides: "After the delivery of
the goods to the buyer and prior to the retaking of them by the
seller, the risk of injury and loss shall rest upon the buyer." The
reasoning behind the section is that the loss should be upon him
who has the goods. The inference to be drawn from the provision
is that before delivery and after repossession by the seller, the risk
is on the seller.
Where the loss is occasioned by the wrongful act of one of
the parties, or occurs while a party is in default in his performance
of the contract, different questions arise. The rule that risk follows
the property in the goods will, in most cases, resolve the questions.
The Uniform Sales Act48 places the risk on the party who is at fault.
However, this rule will not work in all instances. If the buyer
wrongfully rejects the goods and the seller elects to rescind the
contract, the property revests in the seller, and since he has the right
to possession of the goods the risk should no longer be on the
39 Continental Supply Co. v. Stephenson, 94 W. Va. 313, 118 S.E. 537
(1924).
See UNwoRm SALEs AcT § 22 (b).
4

OBloyd v. Pollock, 27 W. Va. 75 (1885).

412 WLLisToN, SALEs § 301
42

W.

VA. CoDE c.

43 § 22 (b).

(rev. ed. 1948).

40, art. 3, § 27 (Michie 1955).
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buyer, but on the seller.44 After the buyer notifies the seller to stop
delivering goods contracted for, shipments subsequent thereto are
at the risk of the seller.45 If the buyer in a conditional sales contract
wrongfully refuses to accept delivery of the goods, is the risk of
the seller who has possession, or with the buyer who is at
loss with
fault?46
It has been suggested that since the actual risk in many instances today is borne by insurers, the greatest need is to establish
a workable rule permitting absolute prediction of the moment the
risk shifts from the seller to the buyer, in order to avoid wasteful
duplication of insurance. 47
If the property in the goods has passed to the buyer and he
is unconditionally entitled to receive the goods, the buyer may
compel delivery by instituting an action for the goods. 48 However,
a court of equity will not entertain jurisdiction for the specific
performance of an agreement respecting goods where compensation
in damages furnishes a complete and satisfactory remedy.49 Whether
property in the goods has passed or not may become material in
a suit for specific performance, in respect to whether the buyer
has an adequate remedy at law, and in an action at law to recover
the goods, it is an essential part of the cause of action.
The West Virginia decisions are in conflict regarding the right
of the buyer to rescind the contract after property in the goods
has vested in the buyer.5 0 In American Sugar Refining Co. v.
Martin-Nelly Grocery Co.,51 it was held that after title has passed
§ 306 (rev. ed. 1948).
41 Benett & Hester v. Dayton, 102 W. Va. 197, 135 S.E. 13 (1926).
46 The buyer is liable to the seller for the price, even though the buyer
refuses to accept delivery of possession. Morgan-Gardner Electric Co. v. BeeCoal Co., 91 W. Va. 347, 112 S.E. 587 (1922).
lick Knob
47
Ailes and Goodwin, Appropriation Tangle in the Law of Sales, 45 W.
VA. L.
4 8 REv. 318, 324 (1939).
"To maintain trover, the plaintiff must show a conversion of personal
property by the defendant and that the plaintiff at the time of the conversion
had a right of property in the thing converted or a right to the immediate
possession thereof. This right to possession must be absolute and unconditional." Haines v. Cochrans, 26 W. Va. 719, 723 (1885). "In an action of
detinue, to justify recovery, plaintiff must aver and prove title and right of
possession, unconditional and not subject to some special right or interest of the
defendant therein." Wayne v. Cyphers, 80 W. Va. 336, 92 S.E. 590 (1917),
syl. 1.
See UNirosu SALEs ACT. § 66.
49
Hessen v. Parrish, 41 W. Va. 686, 24 S.E. 600 (1866). Cf. UNoRM
SALEs60 AcT § 68.
5 See Note, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 134 (1937).
5190 W. Va. 730, 111 S.E. 759 (1922).
442 Wr.LLsmoN, SALES
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to the buyer, he cannot rescind for breach of warranty, but his
remedy is an action for damages. However, in Kemble v. Wiltison52
the court, without mentioning the earlier case, adopted the so-called
Massachusetts rule as the correct one and held that where there is
a contract for the sale of personal property, expressly warranted
by the seller, the buyer, upon delivery of the property to him,
even though title has passed and vested in him, may rescind upon
discovering that the warranty has been broken, provided he acts
promptly and does not so use the property as to indicate that he
unequivocally accepts it in satisfaction of the contract.
Where the contract is not severable, the buyer having a right
to rescind or reject must rescind or reject in toto, and by keeping
or using a part of the goods, the buyer waives his right to rescind.5 3
But where the contract is severable, the acceptance by the buyer
of a part of the goods, does not preclude his rejection of the remainder delivered afterward, when they do not conform to the
contract, and as to them he may have rescissioIn5 4
If the seller refuses to accept the return of goods rightfully
rejected, the buyer may dispose of them as the agent of the seller
ex necessitate rei.55
The seller of personal property for cash, who has not been
paid, has a lien for the price so long as he retains possession of
the goods.3 6 Surrender of possession destroys the lien.5 7 However,
the lien is not defeated by a qualified delivery.5 8 The lien of the
seller is independent of the title and exists although title has passed
to the buyer.5 9 Although the goods may have gone out of the possession of the seller, under the doctrine of stoppage in transitu, the
seller may cause the goods to be stopped in transit before they
come into the possession of the buyer, because of the buyer's insolvency or likelihood of his insolvency or where the buyer is an
infant. 60 A rightful stoppage does not work a rescission of the con5292 W. Va. 32, 114 S.E. 869 (1922). See UNuoRm SALES AcTr § 69.
53
Dixie Appliance Co. v. Bourne, 138 W. Va. 810, 71 S.E.2d 151 (1953).
54
Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S.E.

12 (1925).
55 Ibid.
56 Curtin v. Isaacsen, 36 W. Va. 391, 15 S.E. 171 (1892).
5587 Williams v. Gillespie, 80 W. Va. 586, 5 S.E. 210 (1888).
Rine & Lynch v. Ireland Lumber Co. 86 W. Va. 114, 103 S.E. 452
(1920).
59
Ibid. See UNworm SALES Acr § 53 (1).
6
OJames v. Christian, 86 Va. 1017, 11 S.E. 984 (1890). See UNIrorm
Co~MnmciAr CODE § 2-705.
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tract, but merely restores the seller's lien, and a wrongful stoppage
61
amounts to no more than a breach of contract by the seller. If
the buyer tenders payment, the seller must accept it and deliver
62
the goods.
Where the seller retains title to the goods until the purchase
price has been paid, he may recover the goods in an action of
detinue so long as any of the unpaid purchase money notes remain
in the seller's hands. 63 Under a conditional sale contract the buyer
is liable to the seller for the purchase price whether or not property
in the goods has passed to the buyer,64 and even though he refuses
65
to accept possession of the goods.
There can be no recovery of the purchase price until the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, and in an action instituted for the price there can be no recovery of damages. 66 If the
title to the goods has passed to the buyer, the seller may recover the
price in an action on the common count for goods bargained and
sold.67 Where a contract is entered into for the manufacture of
goods specially for the needs of the buyer and cannot be sold on
the general market, upon completion of manufacture and tender
to the buyer, title passes to the buyer and upon a wrongful rejection
by him, the seller may hold the goods for the account of the buyer
and maintain an action for the price.68 In an action for the price,
the burden is on the seller to show that the goods were of the
69
kind and quality required by the contract.
Upon notification by the buyer that he will not accept delivery
of the goods contracted for, if shipped to him, the seller is excused
from tendering delivery, and after notifying the buyer that he will
not assent to a cancellation of the contract, upon a refusal of the
buyer to make disposition of the goods, the seller may sell them
61

Sharp v. Campbell, 89 W. Va. 526, 109 S.E. 611 (1921).

62f bid
6
3 Orenstein-Arthur Koppel Co. v. Martin, 77 W. Va. 793, 88 S.E. 1064

(1916).

64W. VA. COD c. 40, art. 3, § 8 (Michie 1955).
O5 Morgan-Gardner Electric Co. v. Beelick Knob Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 347,
112 S.E. 587 (1922).
66 Ibid.
67Acme
Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 61 S. E. 235 (1908).
8

6 Emerson Shoe Co. v. Neely, 102 W. Va. 158, 134 S.E. 738 (1926).
See UNwoPR SALFS Acr § 63 (3). Under the act a seller is permitted to
recover the purchase price although property has not passed to the buyer, if
the goods are not readily salable on the general market.
0
9Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 100 W. Va. 515, 131. S.E.

12 (1925).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [1958], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
at the market price for the account of the buyer.7 0 The seller may
recover from the buyer the difference between the contract price
and the amount received on resale. 1 After notice to the buyer of
his intention to sell for the buyer's account, the seller may use his
72
discretion as to the time and place of such resale.
Although West Virginia has been comparatively slow in enacting new legislation to deal with problems which arise in sales
transactions, the cases indicate that this state, in resolving these
problems by the application of accepted common law principles,
is not out of line with the other states where such legislation has
been adopted.
L. P. P.

Tim ScoPE Ov AuHoBrrY OF

Comm issioNE

=iE CoUNTY COURT AND Tie

oF AccouNrs IN

=a PROBATE OF ESTATES

The scope of authority of the county court and its commissioner of accounts in regard to the probate of estates seems to have
caused a great deal of consternation of late among the lawyers of
West Virginia. This note makes no attempt to clarify that confusion, but serves only to put into print the problem as it exists
today. Any clarification must necessarily be made by the West
Virginia Legislature.
Courts of chancery and ecclesiastical courts were the original
courts of jurisdiction over probate matters in England.' In the
United States, however, the courts of probate have been regulated
by statute.2 In West Virginia, by the constitution of 1880, 3 and by
legislative enactment in 1882,4 exclusive jurisdiction over probate
70

71
7

Allen v. Simmons, 90 W. Va. 774, 111 S.E. 838 (1922).

Ibid.

2 American Canning Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 68 W. Va. 698, 70
S.E. 756 (1911).
1 See WoRas, COURTs AND TnEm JUIUsDcTION 431-460 (1894).
2 Ibid.

3 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 24.
4 The West Virginia Legislature in their regular session of 1872-3, by
chapter 136, placed concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court along with the

county court on probate matters. In 1882, the repealing clauses of chapters
68 and 84, revoked the concurrent jurisdiction and gave the county court
exclusive jurisdiction over probate.
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